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Choosing on influence
Tugce Cuhadaroglu
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Interaction, the act of mutual influence, is an essential part of daily life and eco-
nomic decisions. This paper presents an individual decision procedure for inter-
acting individuals. According to our model, individuals seek influence from each
other for those issues that they cannot solve on their own. Following a choice-
theoretic approach, we provide simple properties that aid us to detect interacting
individuals. Revealed preference analysis not only grants underlying preferences,
but also the influence acquired.
Keywords. Interaction, social influence, boundedly rational decision making,
two-stage maximization, incomplete preferences.
JEL classification. D01, D03, D11.
Individuals who share the same environment, such as members of the same house-
hold, friends from school, or colleagues from the workplace, influence each others’ be-
havior through different means of interaction such as advice, inspiration, and imitation.
There is an immense economics literature documenting and analyzing the effect of so-
cial interactions on individual decisions.1 However, not enough attention has been paid
to the particular decision procedures individuals administer to interact, leaving the mi-
crofoundations of social interactions rather unexplored.2 Addressing this gap, the cur-
rent paper presents and studies a particular individual decision procedure for interact-
ing agents.
Choice on mutual influence (CMI) works as follows: Consider two individuals who
are endowed with transitive but not necessarily complete preferences. Facing a decision
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problem, each individual first maximizes his/her own preferences. If this yields a single
alternative, that alternative is chosen. If not, individuals appeal to each other’s prefer-
ences in a second stage to be able to further refine their choices. Let us introduce an
example to demonstrate the process.
Example 1. Let X = {x y z}, and consider two individuals 1 and 2 with the preferences
x 1 y and z 2 x, respectively.3 Assume that both 1 and 2 are asked to choose from X .
Individual 1 likes x better than y. Maximization of 1 leads to the elimination of y, leav-
ing two individually uncomparable options, x and z. To choose between x and z, 1 seeks
the influence of 2. Since z 2 x, upon 2’s advice, 1 ends up choosing z. Individual 2’s
decision process, alternatively, involves elimination of x in the first stage since z 2 x.
Since neither of them is able to rank y and z, 2 cannot refine her choice further. Thus, 1
ends up choosing z from X , whereas 2 ends up with y and z. ♦
CMI is a natural process of decision making for individuals with incomplete prefer-
ences. Notice that unless an individual has complete preferences for all those alterna-
tives that the other individual cannot compare, the choice outcome will not be unique,
as exemplified above. For this reason we do not restrict our attention to single-valued
choice; we allow for set-valued choice outcomes.4
Our main result is the characterization of CMI. Three falsifiable properties of the
choice behavior of two individuals characterize this type of interaction. The first prop-
erty, expansion, is a well known individual rationality property. The remaining two prop-
erties are novel to our model. Nullipotency states that all the influence that could be
created among these individuals is already inherent in their behavior; no further inter-
action could cause further refinement of their final choices. The key property of our
model, consistency of influence, ensures that any violation of consistency in an individ-
ual’s choice data indicates the influence acquired. This allows us to link individuals to
each other by tracing inconsistencies in their choices. For two individuals to be inter-
acting according to CMI, they have to account for each other’s inconsistencies.
Our contributions to the literature are twofold. First, we provide a first attempt for
a new approach to a problem that is mostly analyzed from an econometrical perspec-
tive. Influence via social interactions has mostly been handled in an applied framework.
Given a group of socially related individuals, many advanced econometrical techniques
are developed and applied with the purpose of identifying the influence individuals cre-
ate on each other.5 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to deploy tools
of choice theory to study interaction. A choice-theoretic approach to interaction is ap-
pealing for several reasons: First, the falsifiable properties allow us to detect interact-
ing individuals from their observable choice behavior. Second, the revealed preference
3Conventionally, x1 y reads as individual 1 strictly prefers alternative x to y .
4Following Sen (1993), we interpret the choice outcomes as “the set of ‘choosable’ elements.” Hence
choosing both x and y from a set means that x and y are both deemed choosable from that set. At times,
the individual might finalize the choice by picking up any of the choosable alternatives.
5In addition to the papers mentioned at the beginning of the introduction, see Blume et al. (2010),
Manski (1993, 2000).
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argument yields the underlying preferences of these individuals, which are generally
nonobservable. Last, the representation theorem also grants us the revealed influence
among these individuals. We should be clear that, at this point, our model does not in-
corporate strategic intentions. Unlike persuasion or compliance models (Cialdini 2007),
in CMI, influence is not payoff relevant for the influencing individual; it only helps the
influenced individual further refine his/her choices.6
Second, presenting a simple and natural model of decision making, we contribute
to the boundedly rational choice literature of recent decades that aims to explain non-
textbook behavior of individuals.7 In particular, as a two-stage maximization process,
CMI is clearly related to the other two-stage maximization processes studied in this
literature.8 The baseline model of two-stage maximization would be rational short-
list methods (RSM) proposed by Manzini and Mariotti (2007). RSM essentially refers
to a single-valued choice mechanism where a two-stage maximization process yields
the chosen alternative uniquely. Two rationality properties—expansion and weak weak
axiom of revealed preferences (WWARP)—are shown to characterize RSM. Rubinstein
and Salant (2008) provide an alternative axiomatization of RSM with an exclusion con-
sistency property. An interesting subclass of RSM—RSM with transitive rationales—is
axiomatized by Au and Kawai (2011), Yildiz (2017), and Horan (2016) independently.
While the former two works make use of properties that impose acyclicity to a revealed
relation, Horan (2016) focuses on choice inconsistencies similar to the approach in this
paper. He shows that RSM with transitive rationales cannot exhibit certain choice in-
consistencies simultaneously. Our model is inherently different from the existing two-
stage maximization procedures: we consider multiple individuals. The second criterion
that the individual uses is not simply another criterion in his/her mind, but another
individual that is also equipped with a choice structure. Hence the behavioral proper-
ties we search for should reveal the mutual relationship between these two individuals,
and identify the specific choice problems where influence is acquired. Moreover, since
we work with set-valued choice behavior, the technical challenges we face are different
than those of the cited papers. The only exception to single-valued RSM is presented
in Garcia-Sanz and R. Alcantud (2015), where they characterize a subset of set-valued
RSMs that satisfy a consistency property. For that particular class of set-valued RSMs,
weak WARP and expansion for correspondences remain sufficient for the characteriza-
tion of choice behavior, which certainly is not the case in general.
The outline of this paper is as follows. The first section introduces CMI. We describe
the model, and present the characterizing axioms and the theorem. We also tackle the
6Having said that, Yildiz (2017) suggests an example of a choice by Stackelberg game of which the equilib-
rium behavior is observationally equivalent to the outcome of a particular two-stage maximization process.
A similar example, involving two Stackelberg games, can also be built for CMI. Thanks to an anonymous
referee for pointing out the example.
7To name a few boundedly rational choice procedures, see Masatlioglu et al. (2012) for limited attention;
Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), Apesteguia and Ballester (2013) for status quo bias; Salant and Rubinstein (2008)
for framing effects; Rubinstein and Salant (2008) for the need for nonstandard models in general.
8In addition to the papers cited, see Bajraj and Ülkü (2015), Manzini and Mariotti (2012), Matsuki and
Tadenuma (2013), Tyson (2012). For a comprehensive account of two-stage mechanisms, see Horan (2016).
For a detailed analysis of identification in RSMs, see Dutta and Horan (2015).
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identification problem in this section. The second section extends the model to multi-
individual settings. The third section is devoted to further comments. The final section
concludes.
1. Choice on mutual influence
1.1 The model
Let X be a nonempty finite set of alternatives and let X be the set of all nonempty
subsets of X . Let 1 and 2 denote two individuals. For any i ∈ {12}, we define the decision
outcomes of i on X as a choice correspondence Ci :X ⇒X with ∅ = Ci(S)⊆ S for all
S ∈X .9
For i ∈ {12}, let i be the strict preference relation of i over X , i.e., an asymmetric
and transitive but not necessarily complete binary relation over X .10 The set of maximal
elements of S according to i will be Max(Si) = {x ∈ S : y ∈ S with yx ∈i}. If indi-
vidual preferences are complete enough to single out a most preferred alternative, i.e.,
if Max(Si) is a singleton, there will be no room for influence. If not, then i would be
seeking influence of j over those choosable alternatives, leading to Max(Max(Si)j).
Definition 1. We say that a pair of choice correspondences (C1C2) is a CMI mech-
anism if there exists a pair of asymmetric and transitive binary relations (12) such
that
C1(S)=Max
(
Max(S1)2
)

C2(S)=Max
(
Max(S2)1
)
for all S ∈X
1.2 Characterization
Now suppose we observe (C1C2). Three simple properties are sufficient to test whether
this pair of behaviors is consistent with CMI. The first property, a well known individual
rationality property, expansion (also known as Sen’s γ), states that if an alternative is
chosen from two different sets, it also is chosen from the union.
Expansion (EXP). For any x ∈ X , ST ∈ X , and i ∈ {12}, if x ∈ Ci(S) ∩ Ci(T), then
x ∈ Ci(S ∪ T).
Unlike EXP, the following two properties are not individual rationality properties, but
are used to reveal the mutual relation between 1 and 2. The first of them, Nullipotency
is required to link C1 and C2 to each other for those problems where they do not yield
a single choice. It states that all the influence that could have come from j is already
9For the sake of brevity, we abuse notation and drop set delimiters and commas whenever we refer to
menus or choices from menus. For instance, we use xy = C1(xyz) to denote 1’s choice of x and y from the
menu {x y z}. Similarly, an ordered pair (x y) ∈X ×X is simply denoted as xy .
10We stick to strict preferences for simplicity purposes. Our results trivially generalize to the case where
indifferences are allowed. Notice that also in this case, ties will be broken whenever the other individual
has a strictly preferred alternative.
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inherent in i’s behavior; the decision outcomes of j cannot be used to further refine i’s
choices:
Nullipotency (NULL). For any S ∈ X and i j ∈ {12} with i = j, we have Cj(Ci(S)) =
Ci(S).
The last property is the key property of CMI in that it allows identification of the
influence of the individuals on each other. Consider two alternatives x y and a choice
problem S with xy ∈ S such that x = Ci(xy) and Ci(S) = Ci(S \ y). Following Horan
(2016), let us call this a weak 〈x y〉 reversal on S.11 In our setting a weak 〈x y〉 reversal
is considered to be the evidence for influence. To see why, first notice that x = Ci(xy)
might be the result of j’s influence on i as well as i’s sincere preference for x over y.
Indeed the existence of a weak 〈x y〉 reversal signals the influence: If x is better than y
according to the underlying transitive preferences, for any choice problem involving x
and y, the existence of y would never alter the final choice.12 Hence x = Ci(xy) is the
result of the influence of j, implying that x is preferred to y by j, not i. But then, since j’s
preferences are also transitive, j would never commit a weak 〈x y〉 reversal him/herself.
Consistency of influence stems from the observation that any choice inconsistency,
which happens to be in the form of 〈x y〉 reversals in this setting, is the result of the
influence taken. Thus, the influential individual has to behave consistently. Let us rep-
resent the lack of 〈x y〉 reversals with an auxiliary relation: We say that x shadows y for i
(xsi y) if Ci(S)= Ci(S \ y) for all S ∈X with x ∈ S.
Consistency of Influence (CoI). For any x y ∈ X and i ∈ {12}, if x = Ci(xy), then x
shadows y at least for one of the individuals.
Our first theorem shows that these properties are necessary and sufficient for choice
on mutual influence.
Theorem 1. Let (C1C2) be a pair of choice correspondences. The pair (C1C2) satisfies
EXP, NULL, and CoI if and only if (C1C2) is a CMI mechanism.
Proof. Necessity is fairly straightforward; thus it is omitted. We prove the sufficiency
part. For i ∈ {12}, choose i =si . Formally,
xy ∈i iff Ci(S)= Ci(S \ y) for all S with xy ∈ S
Notice that i is asymmetric by definition since xy yx ∈i implies that ∅= Ci(xy). To
see the transitivity of i, take any x y z ∈ X with xy yz ∈i. Take any S ∈ X with
xz ∈ S. If y ∈ S, then by yz ∈i, Ci(S)= Ci(S \z). Let y /∈ S and consider S∪y. By xy ∈i,
Ci(S ∪ y)= Ci(S). By yz ∈i, Ci(S ∪ y)= Ci(S ∪ y \ z). By xy ∈i, Ci(S \ z∪ y)= Ci(S \ z).
But then Ci(S)= Ci(S \ z).
11Horan (2016) shows that for choice functions, committing a weak 〈x y〉 reversal is equivalent to violat-
ing independence of irrelevant alternatives. For choice correspondences these two properties are indepen-
dent.
12Transitivity implies that when x is strictly better than y , anything worse than y is also worse than x.
Hence all alternatives that are eliminated by y in maximization are already eliminated by x, yielding
Max(Si)=Max(S \ yi).
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Take any S ∈ X . We now show that Max(Max(Si)j) ⊆ Ci(S). Take any x ∈
Max(Max(Si)j). Obviously x ∈Max(Si). We claim that for any z ∈Max(Si), x ∈
Ci(xz). To see that, take any z ∈Max(Si) and assume, to the contrary, that z =Ci(xz).
Since x ∈ Max(Si), there exists T ∈ X with xz ∈ T such that Ci(T) = Ci(T \ x).
But then CoI and the definition of j imply that zx ∈j . This is a contradiction with
x ∈ Max(Max(Si)j), which proves the claim that x ∈ Ci(xz) for all z ∈ Max(Si).
But then EXP implies that x ∈ Ci(Max(Si)).
We conclude this part of the proof by showing that Ci(Max(Si)) = Ci(S) so that
x ∈ Ci(Max(Si)) also implies x ∈ Ci(S). First notice that for any y ∈ S \ Max(Si),
there exists y ′ ∈Max(Si) such that y ′y ∈i since i is transitive. But then by definition
of i, Ci(Max(Si)) = Ci(Max(Si) ∪ y). Iterative application of the same argument
yields that Ci(Max(Si))= Ci(S), establishing that x ∈ Ci(S).
The last part of the proof is to show that Ci(S) ⊆ Max(Max(Si)j). Take any
x ∈ Ci(S). By definition of i, x ∈ Max(Si). Assume, to the contrary, that x /∈
Max(Max(Si)j). Then by transitivity of j , there exists z ∈ Max(Max(Si)j)
such that zx ∈j . As we have shown in the previous step, z ∈ Max(Max(Si)j) im-
plies that z ∈ Ci(S). By definition of j , zx ∈j implies that x /∈ Cj(T) for any T ∈ X
with xz ∈ T . But then, by NULL, Cj(Ci(S)) = Ci(S), which creates the desired contra-
diction since both xz ∈ Ci(S). 
The independence of the properties is easily demonstrated by specific examples.
Consider X = {x y z}, x = C1(xy), y = C1(yz), x = C1(xz), and x = C1(xyz). If x =
C2(xy), y = C2(yz), x = C2(xz), and y = C2(xyz), CoI and NULL are satisfied but EXP
is not. If instead, y = C2(xy), z = C2(yz), x= C2(xz), and x= C2(xyz), CoI is not satisfied
but the others are. Finally, if xy = C2(xy), z = C2(yz), z = C2(xz), and z = C2(xyz), NULL
is the only one that is not satisfied.
The key point of our characterization exercise lies in the following observation: i’s
choice behavior not only reveals information about i’s underlying preferences but also
j’s underlying preferences. Individuals have to account for each other’s inconsistencies.
An interesting implication arises for identical choice behaviors. For C1 = C2 = C, it is
immediate to see that (CC) has a CMI representation if and only if C is quasi-rational,
i.e., is consistent with the maximization of a transitive asymmetric binary relation13 and,
hence, does not display any choice inconsistencies. Moreover if C is single-valued, then
the same statement holds if and only if C is a rational choice function.
It is worth noting that when choice is restricted to a unique alternative, the charac-
terization of CMI can be obtained similarly by EXP and CoI properties as NULL becomes
redundant.14
1.3 Identification
The characterization theorem ensures that given a particular pair of choice behaviors
(C1C2) satisfying EXP, NULL, and CoI, we can recover a pair of revealed preferences
13See Plott (1973) for characterization of transitive asymmetric relations.
14Indeed this is a direct implication of the first part of the characterization proof, which shows that x ∈
Max(Max(Si)j) yields x ∈ Ci(S), without referring to NULL.
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(12) that would represent (C1C2) according to CMI. But in some situations one
can actually find other pairs of revealed preferences that would explain the same choice
behavior.15 But then the following question arises immediately: How accurately can we
actually identify the underlying preferences (and hence the influence)? To answer this
question, we investigate the common part of all pairs of preferences that explain a given
(C1C2).
Unlike the standard revealed preference argument, in our setting, choices from bi-
nary menus do not necessarily reveal the underlying preferences; they also reflect the
influence acquired. Consider the mutually exclusive sets of binary comparisons: Dis-
agreements, influences acquired, influences formed, and agreements, where the follow-
ing definitions apply.
• Disagreements of i from j: Di = {xy ∈X ×X : x= Ci(xy) = Cj(xy)}.
• Influence of i over j: Ii = {xy ∈X ×X : x= Ci(xy)= Cj(xy) and there exists S ∈X
with x ∈ S such that Cj(S) = Cj(S \ y)}.
• Agreements: A = {xy ∈ X × X : x = Ci(xy) = Cj(xy) and Ci(S) = Ci(S \ y) and
Cj(S)= Cj(S \ y) for all S ∈X with x ∈ S}.
Notice that (Di ∪ Ii ∪ A) = {xy ∈ X × X : Ci(S) = Ci(S \ y) for all S ∈ X with x ∈ S}
coincides with the shadows relation for i: si . In the proof of Theorem 1, we show that
the pair (s1s2) explains a given pair of choice behaviors (C1C2) consistent with CMI.
Indeed the pair (s1s2) is the largest pair of binary relations (in terms of set inclusion)
that would explain (C1C2); it is not possible to add another binary comparison to either
of the relations and yet explain the same data. However, one can find subsets of these
relations that would explain the same choices.
A first observation is that any pair of preferences explaining a given (C1C2) has to
possess the binary pairs that two individuals disagree on, D1 and D2. These refer to the
pairs of alternatives about which the individuals have reverse tastes. Moreover, thanks
to CoI, we are able to detect the pairs of alternatives where an influence is acquired for
sure, I1 and I2. Finally, since preferences are defined to be transitive, the ordered pairs
that are not necessarily in Di or Ii, but implied by transitivity of i, will be common
to any pair of preferences for the given (C1C2). Let us denote the transitive closure of
Di ∪ Ii as tr(Di ∪ Ii).16 Thus, the intersection of all pairs of preferences that explain given
choice data will be (tr(D1 ∪ I1) tr(D2 ∪ I2)). This refers to the part of the preferences
that is uniquely identified. The following theorem shows that any transitive completion
of the pair (tr(D1 ∪ I1) tr(D2 ∪ I2)) with the binary comparisons in A explains the given
choice behavior.
Let us define an A-completion of (tr(D1∪ I1) tr(D2∪ I2)) as (tr(D1∪ I1∪A1) tr(D2∪
I2 ∪ A2)) for A1 ⊆ A and A2 ⊆ A such that A1 ∪ A2 = A. Notice that when A1 = A2 =
A, the A-completion coincides with the pair of shadow relations, i.e., (tr(D1 ∪ I1 ∪
15We say that (12) explains (rationalizes) (C1C2) if C1(S) = Max(Max(S1)2) and C2(S) =
Max(Max(S2)1).
16The transitive closure of a binary relation is the smallest transitive relation that contains it.
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A1) tr(D2 ∪ I2 ∪ A2)) = (s1s2). Also notice that for A1 = ∅, we have A2 = A and,
hence, (tr(D1 ∪ I1)s2) is also an A-completion.
Theorem 2. Let (C1C2) be a CMI mechanism. Then any preference pair (12)
that explains (C1C2) is identified uniquely up to A-completions of the pair (tr(D1 ∪
I1) tr(D2 ∪ I2)).
Proof. Let (C1C2) be a CMI mechanism.
Necessity. Consider any (12) explaining (C1C2). Fix i j ∈ {12} with i = j, with-
out loss of generality. We first show that tr(Di ∪ Ii) ⊂i. Take any xy ∈ Di. Since
y = Cj(xy), by definition of CMI, we have xy /∈j . But then x = Ci(xy) implies that
xy ∈i. Now take any xy ∈ Ii. As there exists S ∈ X with x ∈ S and Cj(S) = Cj(S \ y),
we have xy /∈j . But then x = Ci(xy) implies that xy ∈i. Thus for any xy ∈ (Di ∪ Ii),
we also have xy ∈i. Transitivity of i proves that tr(Di ∪ Ii) ⊂i. Now we only need
to show that for any xy ∈ (i \ tr(Di ∪ Ii)) we have xy ∈ A. Take such xy and notice that
by definition of CMI, xy ∈i implies that x = Ci(xy) and Ci(S) = Ci(S \ y) for all S ∈ X
with x ∈ S. The noninclusion xy /∈ Di implies that x = Cj(xy) and xy /∈ Ii implies that
Cj(S)= Cj(S \ y) for all S ∈X with x ∈ S. But then, by definition of A, we have xy ∈A.
Sufficiency. We now show that any A-completion of (tr(D1 ∪ I1) tr(D2 ∪ I2)) ex-
plains (C1C2). Take any A-completion, (tr(D1 ∪ I1 ∪ A1) tr(D2 ∪ I2 ∪ A2)), and
for ease of notation let us denote it by (∗1∗2). In the proof of Theorem 1 we
have shown that (s1s2) explains (C1C2). Below we show that Max(Max(S∗i )
∗j ) = Max(Max(Ssi )sj) for any S ∈ X and for i j ∈ {12} with i = j, thus any A-
completion also explains (C1C2).
(I) First notice that since si =Di ∪ Ii ∪A, we have ∗i ⊆si and, hence, Max(Ssi )⊆
Max(S∗i ) for any S and i ∈ {12} [1]. (II) Next notice that by definition of A-completion,
xy ∈ (si \ ∗i ) implies that xy ∈∗j for i j ∈ {12} with i = j . We will refer to the argu-
ments (I) and (II) in the rest of the proof.
Take any S ∈X . We claim that Max(Max(S∗i )∗j )⊆Max(Max(Ssi )sj) to start
with. To prove this, take any x ∈ Max(Max(S∗i )∗j ) and assume, to the contrary, that
x /∈ Max(Max(Ssi )sj). There are two possible cases, both of which result in the de-
sired contradiction as we show below.
Case 1: Choice x is eliminated in the first stage. Then, by transitivity of si , there
exists y ∈ Max(Ssi ) with yx ∈si . Since x ∈ Max(S∗i ) and by (I), y ∈ Max(S∗i ), we
have yx /∈∗i . But then (II) implies that yx ∈∗j . Since, y ∈ Max(S∗i ), we contradict
x ∈Max(Max(S∗i )∗j ), as desired.
Case 2: Choice x is eliminated in the second stage. Then, by transitivity of sj , there
exists y ∈ Max(Max(Ssi )sj) with yx ∈sj . Since y ∈ Max(Ssi ), (I) implies that y ∈
Max(S∗i ). Since x ∈ Max(Max(S∗i )∗j ), we have yx /∈∗j . Thus, we have yx ∈ (sj
\ ∗j ). But then (II) implies that yx ∈∗i , creating a contradiction to x ∈ Max(S∗i ), as
desired.
We finally claim that Max(Max(Ssi )sj) ⊆ Max(Max(S∗i )∗j ). Take any x ∈
Max(Max(Ssi )sj) and assume, to the contrary, that x /∈ Max(Max(S∗i )∗j ). Simi-
larly, we have the following cases, which end in contradictions as desired:
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Case 1: Choice x is eliminated in the first stage. Since x ∈ Max(Ssi ), (I) creates the
desired contradiction.
Case 2: Choice x is eliminated in the second stage. Then, by transitivity of ∗j ,
there exists y ∈ Max(Max(S∗i )∗j ) with yx ∈∗j . Since ∗j ⊆sj , yx ∈sj . But then
x ∈ Max(Max(Ssi )sj) implies that y /∈ Max(Ssi ). Then, by transitivity of si , there
exists z ∈ Max(Ssi ) with zy ∈si . Since y ∈ Max(S∗i ), we have zy /∈∗i . Thus we have
zy ∈ (si \ ∗i ). But then, (II) implies that zy ∈∗j . Since by (I), z ∈Max(S∗i ), zy ∈∗j cre-
ates a contradiction to y ∈ Max(Max(S∗i )), proving the claim and, hence, establishing
the result. 
Theorem 2 ensures that we can recover a major part of underlying preferences and,
hence, the influence. The overidentification problem relates to those ordered pairs
in A.17 Consider the extreme case where two individuals show exactly the same choice
behavior overall. Then since Di = Ii =∅, we cannot conclude whether two individuals
actually have the same preferences or one of them has null preferences and is getting
fully influenced by the other. In the other extreme, if we observe a pair of choice be-
haviors with a null A, we can completely identify the underlying preferences and the
influence. In general, if we observe that tr(Di ∪ Ii)= (Di ∪ Ii ∪A) for both i ∈ {12}, then
it is immediate to see by Theorem 2 that a unique pair of preferences explains this choice
behavior.
2. Extension to multi-individual settings
CMI is a simple decision mechanism for interacting individuals. Despite its simplicity, it
is powerful enough to easily extend to multi-individual settings and explain more com-
plicated forms of social interactions, as we try to exemplify in this section. Consider a
group N consisting of n individuals. Each individual i ∈ N is equipped with a transitive
and asymmetric i over X . Given a choice problem, i first maximizes i. As long as this
first stage does not yield a unique choice, a second stage involving some kind of inter-
action with other group members takes place so as to refine the choice outcomes. Here
are several examples as to what might happen in that second stage interaction.
Example 2 (Unanimous Influence). The second stage of the decision process of each i
involves a consideration of the opinions of all other group members. If all others agree
on the same ranking of alternatives, then i behaves accordingly. Otherwise no influence
is acquired. ♦
17Let us note that further information about the underlying preferences might also help. The identifica-
tion issue arises due to the fact that although i is actually indecisive between some x and y , he/she does
not commit a weak 〈x y〉 reversal. But this only happens if x and y are too “similar” in terms of their rela-
tive comparison to the other alternatives for both of the agents: whatever is better than x for i is also not
worse than y and whatever is worse than y for i is also not better than x at least for one of the agents. More-
over, no alternative that is better than x is better than any alternative that is worse than y , again at least
for one of the agents. This observation translates as a richness condition on the pair of preferences. When
underlying preferences are assumed to be “rich enough” as well as being transitive and asymmetric, they
are uniquely identified. Certainly whether richness is a reasonable assumption is open to discussion. This
result is available upon request.
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Example 3 (Directed Influence). For each i, there is one other j to whose preferences i
refers in the second stage. Notice that influence is not necessarily mutual here; instead
it forms a directed network of interacting individuals. ♦
Example 4 (Expert Influence). The group includes various experts: individuals who
know better than the others about certain alternatives. In the second stage, individu-
als seek expert influence: Whenever i is unable to choose from several alternatives that
happen to be in j’s expertise, he/she refers to j’s opinion. Since individuals have distinct
sets of expertise, i gets influenced by different experts on different issues. ♦
These are a few natural extensions of CMI to multi-individual environments. The
interesting question for the outside observer becomes how to figure out their distinc-
tive features. What kind of properties of the observed choice behaviors, (C1C2    Cn)
allow us to differentiate these scenarios from each other?
Depending on what we have learned from CMI, we know that following choice in-
consistencies is the key to answering this question. Variations of CoI would allow us to
detect the influence acquired as well as the influential individual(s). Variations of NULL,
alternatively, would ensure, given that j influences i, that any influence that j could po-
tentially have on i is indeed acquired.
In this text we only provide the characterization of the last example, which happens
to be a nontrivial extension.18 Choice on expert influence (CEI) is an intuitive individual
decision model for groups with an inherent division of expertise. For instance, within
a group of friends, it is quite natural for everyone to refer to a specific person for trip
advice and to another person for advice on which car to buy. Similarly, in an economics
department, it is quite natural for a microeconomist to refer to an econometrician’s view
to resolve a dispute about the contribution of an econometrics paper as well as to refer
to a macroeconomist for a macroeconomics paper.
Let Ei ⊂ X denote the expertise of individual i. For simplicity purposes, we assume
that areas of expertise are disjoint; Ei ∩ Ej = ∅ for i = j. If an individual j does not
possess any expertise, then Ej = ∅. Let (j |Ej) denote the part of the preference of j
over the alternatives in his/her expertise, i.e., (j |Ej) = {xy ∈j : x y ∈ Ej}. Then the
expert rationale of this society will be E =⋃j∈N(j |Ej).
Definition 2. We say that (C1C2    Cn) is a CEI mechanism, if there exists n
asymmetric and transitive binary relations (12    n) and n areas of expertise
E1E2    En such that Ci(S)=Max(Max(Si)E) for all S ∈X and for all i ∈N .
18The characterization of the others can also be obtained by adjusting the two properties accordingly: In
choice on unanimous influence, the second stage relation of i is simply
⋂
j∈N\{i} j . Hence NULL becomes,
for all i and S,
⋃
j∈N\{i} Cj(Ci(S)) = Ci(S). Similarly, CoI states that whenever x = Ci(xy), then x shadows y
for i or for all j ∈ N \ {i}. Characterization of choice on directed influence very closely follows that of CMI
when choice outcomes are restricted to unique alternatives. Then, in addition to EXP, the property that for
each i, there exists a j such that CoI holds is sufficient to characterize the model. When set-valued outcomes
are allowed, characterization becomes trickier since xy = Ci(xy) no longer implies that xy = Cj(xy) simply
because j influencing i can him/herself be influenced by another individual k. Still we can characterize this
model by straightforward adjustments of CoI and NULL under an additional assumption on preferences.
That result is available upon request.
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Let I denote the set of binary pairs associated with at least one inconsistency:
I = {xy ∈X×X : An 〈x y〉 reversal has been committed by some i ∈N}. These are the bi-
nary pairs for which an influence has been acquired. The following consistency property
brings some structure to this set.
Consistency of Expert Influence (CoEI). For any xy ∈ I, there exists j ∈ N such that x
shadows y for j. Moreover, for any z ∈X with yz ∈ I, y shadows z for j.
CoEI ensures that for any influence acquired, there is an expert j behind it. More-
over, if j is the expert on a pair of issues, any related influence has to come from j. Notice
that this is the case since areas of expertise are disjoint. We now introduce the NULL
counterpart of this setting, a property that accounts for the set-valued outcomes. Bind-
ing influence states that if there is an expert on a certain set of issues, it is not possible
not to be influenced by him/her.
Binding Influence (BI). For any binary chain x1x2x2x3     xt−1xt ∈ I, we have
xlxk = Ci(xlxk) for any lk ∈ {12     t}, for all i ∈N .
The existence of a binary chain in I indicates the existence of an expert for the alter-
natives that constitute a part of this chain. BI ensures that the expert is actually influen-
tial. CoEI and BI are the properties that build the interaction links between individuals.
Apart from these, we need two individual rationality properties: EXP and a weakening
of weak WARP for correspondences.
Weak WARP* (WWARP*). For any x y ∈ X and i ∈ N , if x = Ci(xy) and x ∈ Ci(S) for
some S ∈X with xy ∈ S, then y /∈ Ci(S).
WWARP* prohibits the choice of an alternative y from a set where another alterna-
tive x, which is uniquely chosen over y from the binary problem, has been chosen.19
Theorem 3. Let (C1C2    Cn) be an n-tuple of choice correspondences. The n-tuple
(C1C2    Cn) satisfies EXP, WWARP*, CoEI, and BI if and only if (C1C2    Cn) is a
CEI mechanism.
Proof. We only prove sufficiency. For i ∈ N , once again choose i ⊆ X × X as i =
si . As shown in the proof of Theorem 1, i is asymmetric, is transitive, and Ci(S) =
Ci(Max(Si)) for any S ∈X . Now, for j ∈N , define Ej as
x y ∈Ej if and only if xy ∈ tr
(j |E′j
)

where x y ∈E′j if and only if xy ∈ (I ∩ j) and for all yz tx ∈ I, we have yz tx ∈j .
Notice that by CoEI, for any xy ∈ I, there exists j ∈ N such that x y ∈ E′j ⊆ Ej . If
Ej ∩ Ek = ∅ for some jk ∈ N , then discard Ej ∩ Ek either from Ej or Ek, randomly.
Notice that this does not break transitivity of (j |Ej) or (k |Ek) thanks to CoEI. Finally,
let E =⋃j∈N(j |Ej). The term E is asymmetric and transitive, since each (j |Ej) is
asymmetric and transitive and areas of expertise are disjoint.
19It is also possible to characterize CMI with EXP, WWARP*, CoI, and a weakening of NULL to binary
problems. Since weakening NULL comes with the cost of an additional WWARP* axiom, we prefer the
previous characterization.
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Now take i ∈ N and S ∈ X . First, take x ∈ Max(Max(Si)E). We show that
x ∈ Ci(Max(Si)) and, hence, x ∈ Ci(S). For any z ∈ Max(Si), we have x ∈ Ci(xz).
This holds since z = Ci(xz) and x ∈Max(Si) imply that zx ∈ I. But then zx ∈E , con-
tradicting x ∈ Max(Max(Si)E). Hence, x ∈ Ci(xz) for all z ∈ Max(Si). But then,
by EXP, x ∈ Ci(Max(Si)), as claimed, establishing that x ∈ Ci(S).
Take x ∈ Ci(S). We finally show that x ∈ Max(Max(Si)E). By definition of i,
x ∈ Max(Si). Assume, to the contrary, that x /∈ Max(Max(Si)E). But then, since
E is transitive, there exists y ∈Max(Max(Si)E) such that yx ∈E . By the previous
part of this proof, we know that y ∈Max(Max(Si)E) implies y ∈ Ci(S). If x= Ci(xy),
since x ∈ Ci(S), by WWARP*, we have y /∈ Ci(S), a contradiction. If y = Ci(xy), since
y ∈ Ci(S), by WWARP*, we have x /∈ Ci(S), a contradiction. Finally, if xy =Ci(xy), then by
BI, there is no binary chain yz1 z1z2     ztx ∈ I, which contradicts yx ∈E , establishing
the proof. 
3. Further comments
3.1 Peer influence versus homophily
A considerable amount of social interaction studies are devoted to the identification
problem of homophily and influence. In this subsection, we want to discuss how our
model can be applied to this specific identification problem.
Homophily refers to the tendency to create social ties with people who are similar
to one’s self.20 Peer influence or social influence, alternatively, is defined as adopting
similar behavioral patterns with people with whom one is socially connected.21 Both
homophily and social influence result in behavioral resemblances between connected
people. However, it is not trivial for an outside observer to identify the underlying rea-
son for particular behavioral resemblances: Do people who are socially connected to
each other behave similarly because of homophily or peer influence? More importantly,
how do we observationally distinguish one from the other? This phenomenon is known
as the identification problem of homophily and social influence, and it is mainly chal-
lenged from an econometrical perspective. Many studies document that both phenom-
ena prevail simultaneously and distinguishing one from the other requires strong para-
metrical assumptions.22
As claimed in the introduction, CMI brings a new approach to this issue. Consider
two socially connected individuals. First of all, as long as our testable properties are
satisfied, revealed preference analysis grants us the potential influence as well as the
underlying preferences. Hence, what is left is to identify the level of homophily of this
20For an overview of research on homophily in general, see McPherson et al. (2001); on couples, see
Blackwell and Lichter (2004); on economic netwo,rks see Currarini et al. (2009).
21For peer influence in teenage behavior, see Evans et al. (1992); in crime, see Glaeser et al. (1996); in
education, see Zimmerman (2003); in labor markets, see Mas and Moretti (2009); over social networks, see
Calvo-Armengol et al. (2009) and Bramoullé et al. (2009).
22See Aral et al. (2009), Bramoullé et al. (2009), Calvo-Armengol et al. (2009), Lewis et al. (2012), Manski
(1993), Noel and Nyhan (2011).
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pair. Although outside the scope of this text, a measure of homophily can easily be con-
structed in terms of the similarity of the individual preferences. The more similar indi-
vidual tastes are, the more homophilic that pair is.23
3.2 Challenges to inference
It is worth acknowledging that our analysis intrinsically assumes that as long as their be-
haviors do not contradict the defining properties of our model, individuals are taken to
be in interaction. Consider two members of a household, say 1 and 2, and assume that
their individual grocery shopping behavior is consistent with CMI. So far, our approach
takes this information, the fact that they are sharing the same environment and do not
violate EXP, NULL, and CoI, for pure evidence of mutual influence between them. How-
ever, it is quite possible to come up with alternative explanations to their behavior. It
might as well be the case that 1 and 2 are actually running short-list methods, where 1
first cares about the healthiness of the product, hence, first short-lists the most healthy
products and then picks the cheapest ones out of this short list, whereas 2 first cares
about affordability and then the healthiness, hence, runs the opposite shortlisting. Their
behavior will look like they are mutually influencing each other, although the underlying
story is entirely different.
It is no coincidence that empirical studies on social interactions also suffer from the
same inference problem, as pointed out by Manski (2000), p. 117:
The second and more fundamental problem is the inherent difficulty of drawing in-
ferences from the data that economists commonly bring to bear to study social inter-
actions. The prevailing practice has been to try to infer the presence of interactions
from observations of the outcomes experienced in a population of interest. However,
the observed outcomes of the population can usually be generated by many different
interaction processes, or perhaps by processes acting on individuals in isolation. Hence
the findings of empirical studies are often open to an uncomfortably wide range of in-
terpretations.
What Manski suggests as a solution to this problem, from which we could also bene-
fit, is “enrichment of data,” “well designed experiments,” and “careful elicitation of per-
sons’ subjective perceptions of the interactions in which they participate.” In particular,
for our setting, observations of choice behavior before and after a certain pair is formed
might be helpful. Similarly, comparing the behavior of an individual in the vicinity of
different individuals can be informative, though still requires cautious inference. In this
regard, there is a lot to be learned from well designed controlled experiments, as Man-
ski suggests, where it is much easier to change a certain parameter with the purpose of
comparing the outcomes.
23An example of a similarity function between preferences would be Kendall’s correlation coefficient τ,
which measures the correlation between two preferences based on the distance between them. Kendall’s τ
for incomplete preferences can be found in Bogart (1973).
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4. Concluding remarks
This study presents a first attempt to provide a choice-theoretic approach to interaction.
We model interaction as a means to deal with an inherent individual necessity: inability
to choose due to incomplete preferences. Our baseline model, CMI, despite its simplic-
ity, is flexible enough to grasp at more convoluted forms of interactions. The charac-
terization of CMI lays out two important properties of choice behavior consistent with
the model: First, choice inconsistencies in one’s behavior correspond to the influences
acquired and, hence, are traced back to the preferences of the influential individual.
Second, all the influence that can be acquired is already inherent in the choice behavior.
These properties correspond to our CoI and NULL properties, respectively. A key obser-
vation, which we also explore in the second section of this paper, is that modifications
of these two properties aid in characterizing various interaction environments.
As the studies of the last decades have shown, expanding the realm of choice data
has provided new explanations for the behaviors that were once classified as “irrational.”
The novelty of this paper lies in its focus on multiple choice behaviors instead of one.
We believe there is still a lot to explore once we go beyond more than one individual’s
behavior.
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